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Organized labor has long been an important phenomenon  in the political, social and
economic  development of nations, as the relationships  between labor, industry and the state
have proved critical elements in the creation of modem economies  and democracies. As a
result of the efforts to better understand these relationships,  the study of organized labor has
become extensive.  One particular area of interest in this study has been the influence  of
unions on wages.  However, previous research was concentrated  in developed  countries,
where the experience of organized labor has been longer and information  more readily
available.
In recent years the examination  of union-nommion  wage differentials has increased
dramatically, primarily due to the advent of increased computational  power, the increased
availability of micro-data and new econometric techniques  (Hirsch and Addison 1985).
Despite unriecedented analytical  capability, with regards to the particular issue of union-
nonunion wage differentials  the literature largely ignores developing  nations.  Notable
exceptions include Moll's study of South African unions (1993), Park's (1991) study of
union-nonunion wage differentials  in Korea and Standing's (1992) study of unions in
Malaysia.  The primary cause of this shortfall stems from the lack of adequate data (Nelson
1991).  Although many economic  surveys are completed each year in developing  nations,
few contain questions regarding unionization. The 1989 Mexican household  survey upon
which this paper is based fulfills this requirment.  This data, coupled with growing interest in
the Mexican labor market fueled by concerns over the North American Free TradeAgreement  (NAFTA),  allows  a rare and timely  opportunity  to examine  union-nonunion  wage
differentials  for an important  developing  country.
The purpose  of the study  is to measure  the collective  bargaining  strength  of Mexican
organized  labor  as reflected  by its effect on the wage  structure,  income  inequality,  and
gender  and ethnic  wage  differentials. The paper  begins  by describing  the data  upon which
the empirical  research  is based  and then discusses  the method  used in determining  the union-
nonunion  wage  differential.  The following  sections  present  the results  of the empirical
analysis. The empirical  results  discuss  various  wage  equations,  variations  in the union  wage
gap, union influence  on gender  and ethnic  wage  determination  and income  inequality.  The
final section  present3  conclusions  and indentifies  the need  for further  research.
Method
in recent years the econometric analysis of the union-nonunion  wage differential has
undergone considerable  debate, much of it centering  on the apparent endogeneity  of union
status in the wage equation (Duncan and Leigh 1985).  Various simultaneous  equation
estimators have been devised in the attempt to mitigate the potential bias presented  by union
selectivity.  Selectivity  arises partly from the individual  worker's choice of union status
(Robinson 1989).  However, these estimation  techniques, though often ingenious, commonly
yield implausable  results and demonstrate substantial  sensitivity  to specification  (see Ashraf
1990 for greater detail concerning methodological  debate). 1 For these reasons, this paper
I  Simultaneo  -s equation techniques  were attempted  in this study, resulting  in the above mentioned  difficulties. The
results are available  from the authors upon request.will rely on an ordinary least squares (OLS) based method to calculate the union-nonunion
wage differential.  Although OLS based methods are prone to the aforementioned  bias, they
are robust.  Furthennore, though the nature of the bias induced by endogeneity  is unclear
(both in magnitude and sign), Lee found it to be upward and smal' ( Lee 1978; see also
L:wis  1986).z
Analysis  of the wage differential in this paper will rely on the estimation  of two
separate OLS earnings equations, one for each sector.  One advantage of this method, unlike
single equation OLS methods employing  a union dummy variable, is that it allows for
differences in the earnings structure.  Equation  (1) represents the estimated  wage equation for
the union sector and equation (2) represents  the equation for the non-union  sector:
W,,  =  X  W,,  +  v,,  (1)
InW,  = XA,.  +  V',  (2)
where LnW represents  the log of hourly earnigs,  the X represents the vector of personal
endowments, and (3  represents the vector of estimated  regression  coefficients. The subscripts
u and n indicate the union and non-union  subsample. The v represents  the error term, while
i the ith observation.
2  Though Lewis (1986)  was unable to determine  the sign or magnitude  in his exhaustive  study of the union-nonunion
wage gap literature, he did suggest that certain theoretical  priors would  preclude that union selectivity  would overestimate
the union-nonunion  wage differential. Lee (1978)  found that correcting  for the bias reduced the estimated  effect of unions
on wages, but only by a modest  two percentage  points.
3To estimate the mean logarithmic unic&-nonunion  wage differential (or wage gap),
equation (b) is constructed  (Hirsch and Addison 1986). The unexplained  differences in log
hourly wage is equivalent  to:
a  - (-X  (3)
The value of d is converted  to a percentage value by (1-et) * 100, where e represents the
exponential function (Halvorsen  and Palmquist 1980). At values below 0.15,  a
approximates a rate (for example, d = 0.104  10.4 percent). The #,3  (x=u,n)  is the
vector of estimated coefficients. The X represents  the vector of either union, nonunion or all
workers' mean characteristics.
Equation (3) estimates  that portion of the mean wage gap that is due to factors other
than differences in mean characteristics. This aspect  is critical to union-nonunion  wage gap
analysis since this "unexplained"  portion comprises  not only the influencc  of unobserved
characteristics  and potential  wage discrimination  on wage rates, but also, in the case of union
analysis, the effectiveness  of union organization  in securing higher wage rates for its
members above those offered in the nonunion sector.  It should  be mentioned that since the
portion of the "unexplained"  wage gap that accrues  to union organization is not separated
from the other aforementioned  influences, the estimated  wage gap reflects only the upper
limit of union bargaining strength.
4While the wage gap can be evaluatWd  either at union or nonunion  mean
characteristics,  this study employs all workers' mean characteristics. The use of all-worker
means, X=(PX,  + (I-P)X,), where P is the proportion of union observations,  corresponds to
asking the question:  for a worker with average  characteristics,  what is the predicted wage
differential  between his/her working in the union and nonunion sectors (Hirsch and Addison
1986)?
To test the statistical significance  of the wage gap the predicted union log hourly
wage of nonunion workers is computed  using the estimated union wage structure and
nonunion characteristics  (predictedl  union InW of nonunion worker  =X,$,j3  + v.,).  The
estimated  union wages and actual wages of nonunion workers are then tested for statistical
difference  employing a standard t-test.
Data
The data used in this analysis come from the 1989 household  survey conducted by the
the National Institute of Geographical  Statistics  and Information  (Instituto  Nacional de
Estadistica  Geografia  e Informatica),  known as the National Income and Expenditure
Household Survey (Encuesta  Nacional  de Ingreso-Gasto  de los Hogares). The survey covers
11,545 households  and contains 57,332 individual  observations. The geographical  coverage
includes each of the 31 Mexican states, representing 260 municipios  (counties)  and the
Federal District.  Each household  is identified  by the state and the municipio  in which it is
5located.  The subsample  upon which this report is uased upon is comprised of 9,954 non-
agricultural workers ranging from 16 to 65 years of age, with positive labor market earnings.
Although the data used in this paper does possess a variable indicating  union status, it
does fall short in regard to some issues relevant to union wage gap analysis.  One
shortcoming is EYe  lack of detailed information  on non-monetary  remuneration. A study by
Freeman (1978) found that union workers receive  a higher proportion of compensation  in
nonpecuniary  forn  than do nonunion workers.  Therefore, it should be kept in mind that the
wage gap may be greater than indicated  since fringe benefits cannot be included  in the
analysis.  Freeman's (1981) analysis indicates that previous estimates  of the union wage
differential understated the union compensation  differential, but only by about two percent
(Hirsch and Addison 1986).
Although the Mexican data do not allow for an adequate examination  of nonpecuniary
compensation,  information  on the incidence  of health insurance coverage among workers is
included.  DJot  surprisingly, the percentage  of those with health care coverage among the
union subsample is significantly  higher than the percentage with coverage in the nomnmion
subsample, at 86 and 56 percent.
The mean values for those variables  used in the analysis for the entire sample, and for
the union and nonunion subsamples  separately, are listed in Table 1.
6Table 1:  Mean Sample Characteristics
Union  Nonunion
Variable  Total  Subsample  Subsample
Years of Schooling  8.4  9.7  7.9
Experience (years)  18.0  18.7  17.7
Hours Worked per Week  44.5  42.2  45.5
Education  Level
Prinary  0.35  0.28  0.38
Secondary  incomplete  0.29  0.28  0.30
Secondary  complete  0.14  0.20  0.12
Tertiary  0.16  0.23  0.13
Industrial Sectors
Extraction  0.02  0.05  0.01
Manufacturing  0.23  0.21  0.24
Utilities  0.01  0.02  0.01
Construction  0.10  0.04  0.12
Commerce  0.14  0.05  0.18
Transportation  0.05  0.06  0.04
Financiai  Services  0.02  0.03  0.02
Services  0.42  0.54  0.37
Municipio Indigenous Percent  2.90  3.01  2.86
Nortiern State Residence  0.23  0.19  0.24
Male  0.67  0.65  0.67
Union Membership  0.30  1.00  0.00
Log of Hourly Earnings  7.85  8.07  7.76
Actual Hour!y Farnings (pesos)  3,522.60  4,076.63  3,298.56
Number of Observations  9,954  2,954  7,000
Source:  INEGI  (1989).
7The union membership variable equals 1 for respondents  answering in the affirmative
to the question,  jEstd  usted qflhiado  a alguna organizacion  laboral o patronal? (Are you
affiliated with a workers' or enmployers'  organization?). The union membership  variable
indicates that 30 percent of the entire sample claims union membership. This figure closely
approximates  previous estimates  of the proportion of the Mexican labor force unionized in
the late 1980s (Nelson 1991).  The service sector possesses  the majority of unionized labor.
The is largely due to the survey's inclusion  of the public sector in the service sector
category.  The average natural log of hourly earnings, defined as the natural log of gross
weekly wage rate, including payments in-kind, divided by hours worked per week, reveals
substantially  higher wage rates among the union than in the nonunion subsample. It is
primarily this difference that will be examined  in this study.
The municipio indigenous  percent variable and the northern state residence variables
measure certain regional characteristics. The municipio indigenous  percent variable controls
for the concentration  of the indigenous  population  and reflects the prooability  that a sampled
individual is indigenous. Sinc=  a specific  question concerning indigenous  origin was not
included in the survey, the percentage of indigenous  people recorded for each municipio in
the 1990 Census was substituted  (INEGI ;990).  The nonunion subsample  municipio
indigenous  percentage average of 3.0 percent is slightly higher than the union subsample  at
2.9 percent (for further discussion  regarding this variable, see Psacharopoulos  and Patrinos
1993).
8One of the most dynamic areas of Mexico is the northern region bordering the United
States.  Due to the political and economic  importance  of this region, especially in light of
NAFTA, the analysis controls for northern state residence.  Northern state residence is
defined by residence in one of the six states along the United States-Mexico  border:  Baja
California Norte, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon and Tampulinas. For the
nonunion subsample, 23 percent of the observations  were from these northem states, as
opposed to 19 percent in the union subsample.
Empirical Findings
Union  AMembership
Table 2 presents the results of a multivariate  logit model which expresses the
probability of someone  being a union member as a function of various characteristics  such as
education  level, gender and so on.  The reported coefficients  are partial derivatives indicating
the change in the probability of union membership  relative to a unit change in one of the
independent  variables.
The probability cf unionization  increases  until secondary schooling  is completed,
whereupon further education  has no additional impact  on the probabilities of union
membership.  Years of experience increases  the probability of union intmbership, albeit at a
slightly diminishing rate.  The coefficient  on northern state residence reveals that labor in the
north is 4.6 percent less likely to organize than labor elsewhere in the country.
9Unions do not seem to be biased against women or indigenous  people in the selection
process.  The probability of union membership is lower for men than for women.  This
finding is  ot completely  surprising in the context of the additional  analysis below that
reveals substantially  lower union wage differcntials  (and thus lower union membership
incentive) for men than for women. However, this finding  is surprising in that it is counter
to many studies in developed  nations, where women are found to be significantly  less likely
to be union members than are men (Hirsch and Addison 1985). The difference in
observations  may partly be explained  by the relatively smaller observed union wage gap
differences  between women and men in more developed  countries. This point is discussed in
greater detail below.  The municipio  indigenous  percent variable is the only nonsignificant
factor.  Given the large wage incentive  to enter the union sector discussed  below, this
nonsignificance  is slightly surprising. Additionally, cultural factors may play a roll in the
propensity of unionization  among indigenous  people.
10Table  2:  Determinants  of Union  Membership  (Logit)
Variable  Marginal  Effect (%)
Education level (residual  =  tio education)
Primary  25.30 *
(7.4)
Secondary Incomplete  39.52 *
(11.1)






Experience squared  -0.03 *
(10.0)
Northern State Residence  -4.55 *
(3.9)
Male  -3.50 *
(3.5)




Model Chi-square  758.35
Mean of Dependent Variable  0.297
Source:  INEGI  (1989).
Note:  Numbers  in parenthesis  are  t-values. t  indicates  significant  at the 99% level.
11Union-Nonunion  Wage  Differential
To begin examination  of the union-nonunion  wage differential, two wage equations
are estimated, one for each sector. The dependent  variable is the log of hourly earnings,
constructed  by taking the log of the monthly wage rate divided by the hours worked per
month {ln(W/brs)).  The estimated equations  including variables reflecting education,
represented  here as years of schooling  splined into four dummy variables, experience (age-
school-6)  and its transformation. Additional  independent  variables include gender,
geographical region, municipio indigenous  concentration  and industrial  sector.  Table 3 lists
the results of the union and nonunion earnings  equations estimates  and the marginal
contributions  of the variables to the overall wage gap.
12Table 3:  Union and Non-union Hourly Earnings  Functions
Sector  Marginal
Contribution
Variable  Union  Nonunion
Education  leveP
Primary  0.320 t  0.249 t  0.025
(3.8)  (6.8)
Secondary  Incomplete  0.532 t  0.621 t  40.027
(6.1)  (15.5)
Secondary  Complete  0.882 t  0.961 t  -0.011
(9.8)  (21.6)
Tertiary  1.226  t  1.425  t  -0.031
(13.6)  (32.3)
Experience  0.038 *  0.055 t  -0.302
(12.1)  (24.5)
Experience  squared  -0.001  t  -0.001  *  0.176
(7.8)  (19.5)
Northern  State  0.123 t  0.258 t  -0.031
(4.7)  (13.9)
Male  0.063  0.161 t  -0.066
(0.1)  (9.1)
Municipio  Indigenous  Percent  0.001  40.008  t  0.026
(0.6)  (7.8)
Industrial Sectorsb
Industrial  Manufacturing  -0.285  -0.275  $  -0.003
(5.6)  (3.4)
Utilities  (electricity  & water)  0.019  40.239  0.003
(0.2)  (1.8)
Construction  -0.197  t  -0.362 t  0.016
(2.8)  (4.4)
Commerce  -0.283  t  40.318  t  0.005
(4.4)  (3.9)
Transportadon  -0.045  -0.212  t  0.008
(0.7)  (2.4)
Financial  Services  -0.034  0.075  -0.003
(0.4)  (0.8)
Services  -0.059  40.322  t  0.107
(1.2)  (4.0)
Constant  6.967  6.757  0.210
Adjusted  R 2 0.324  0.303
N  2,793  6,907
Adjusted  Wage  Gap  0.104t
Source:  INEGI  (1989)
Notes:  t significant  at the 95% level. t  signifcant  at the 99% level. a Residual  is no education. I Residual  sector is
extraction. Numbers  is parenthesis  are t values.  ,  is the estimated  coefficient. u and n subscripts  represent
union  and nonunion  subsamples,  respectively.  it is the full  sample  weighted  variable  mean.
13As Table 3 indicates, educational  attaimnent has a significant  positive impact on
earnings.  However, the form of this impact differs between the two sectors.  In the union
sector, the returns to education  profile is flatter than in the nonunion sector.  In the union
sector, the difference in returns to education  between those with some primary schooling
versus those with tertiary education  is less than the corresponding  comparison  in the
nonunion  sector.  The negative  marginal contribution found among those with greater than
primary education reflects a wage disincentive  for those with more education to entering the
union sector.
Other personal and regional characteristics  such as experience, gender and municipio
indigenous  concentration also show marked differences between sectors.  Returns to labor
market experience are greater in the noniunion  sector, contributing  a 5.5 percent wage
increase per year of labor market experience versus 3.8 percent in the union sector.  The
-0.302  marginal contribution  of experience reveals that a large portion of the wage gap
favoring the nonunion sector is due to the greater experience premiums in that sector than in
union sector.  Furthermore, as Figure 1 shows, the effect of experience  on union-nonunion
wage differences varies in a distinct 'U'  pattern, as the differential initially  decreases then
eventually increases with greater experience. The minimum  wage differential on the wage
gap-experience  profile occurs at around 23 years of experience.
14Figure 1:  Experience  - Union Wage Gap Profile
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Source: Estimated from results in Table 3.
The coefficients  for gender and ethnicity reveal a significant  difference  between the
union and nonunion sectors with regards to gender and ethnic wage differentials. In the
nonunion sector, men enjoy a 17.5 percent wage advantage  over women, whereas in the
union sector the coefficient for gender is nonsignificant,  highly suggestive  of greater gender
equality in the union sector than in the nonunion  sector.  Similarly, wage equality for
indigenous  people seems to be potentially  greater in the union sector.  The coefficient  of the
municipio indigenous  percent variable in the nonunion sector equation  reveals a -C.8 percent
earning disadvantage  for each percent of indigenous  population  within a mwnicipio,  whereas
the same coefficient in the union sector equation is nonsignificant. Variations  in the wage
differential due to gender and indigenous  probability are examined more closely in latter
sections.
15The dummy variable  controlling for northern state residence reveals further
differences between the union and nonunion sectors.  The northern state variable shows
greater wage gains accruing to northern state residence  for those in the nonunion sector than
in the union sector, at 29.4 versus 13.1 percent.  The marginal effect reveals a -3.1 percent
erosion of potential union bargaining strength.  In the rapidly growing northern region of
Mexico along the United States border, this dispanty may be due to several factors.  Among
other reasons, it may reflect regional factors that are unfavorable  to unions, namely, an
unrestricted labor supply and/or highly competitive  industries. Union-nonunion  wage gaps
are difficult to maintain where substitution  by firms in production and consumers in
consumption is most easy.  A large labor supply fueled  by heavy migration is likely to inhibit
union bargaining power by enabling industry to more easily substitute  union labor with
nonunion labor.  Thus the more elastic supply of labor in the northern border region may
have much to do with explaining  the reduction in the union wage gap (Fatemi 1988).
Similarly, highly competitive  industries forced to operate at or near cost also inhibit union
bargaining power by diminishing  room to negotiate  wage increases. Demand effects may
result in a shift away from more costly products from the union sector (assuming  unions
raise prices) to relatively less costly products from the nonunion sector.  As long as labor
supplies in the nonunion sector are not perfectly elastic, demand effects will put upward
pressure on wages in the nonunion sector and thus mitigate the union wage gap (Hirsch and
Addison 1986).  However, as will be discussed in greater detail below, the difference in
estimated coefficients is likely to be capturing the higher nonunion  wage rates in the northern
region compared to nonunion wage rates in the rest of the country.  The union wage gap
16estimated solely among northern states is -0.02, revealing a potential wage disadvantage  in
union membership.
The variables  controlling for economic  sector reveal increased inter-sectoral  wage
equality in the union sector than in the nonunion  sector for the nation as a whole.  Workers
in all industries, except manufacturing, finance and utilities, improve their wage status, in
relation to the omitted category (extraction), once unionized. In the union sector, the
industry with the greatest wage disadvantage  vis-a-vis  the extraction industry is
manufacturing, with a -33.0 percent wage disadvantage. It is interesting  to note that the
marginal contribution  of industrial manufacturing, -0.3 percent, reveals a possible nonunion
wage advantage. In the nonunion sector, services  are the most disadvantaged,  at -38.0
percent.  However, in the union sector, services wage disadvantage  is greatly reduced, at -
6.0 percent, which is reflected in the substantial 10.7 percent marginal contribution  to the
overall union-nonunion  wage differential.
The summation  of the marginal contributions  equals the overall union-nonunion  wage
differential.  From the two estimated  earnings equations, the wage gap (eq. 3) is measured at
nearly 10.4 percent, indicating  that while controlling for certain wage generating
characteristics, those in the union sector earn 10.4 percent more in hourly wages than do
those in the nonunion sector.  This value is somewhat  less than the average value of 14
percent derived by Lewis (1986) in his review of union-nonunion  wage diffcrentiabs  in the
United States covering the period 1967 to 1979. Furthermore, it is below the lowe;st  average
17yearly value of 0.11 observed  during the same time span (Lewis 1986).  Recalling the
historical context of organized labor in Mexico during the 1980s, a period of particular
difficulty induced by recession  coupled with government  austerity measures, this relatively
smaller differential is not surprising (Middlebrook 1989).
The average wage differentials  for individuals  categorized  by gender, experience and
education  are presented in Table 4.  It is clear that working women enjoy a greater wage
advantage  in the union sector than do men of corresponding  education  and experience.  As
the earnings equations coefficient  for gender would indicate, there is, on average, a 9.8
percentage point difference  between male and female wage differentials. With regard to
experience, the aforementioned  'U'  pattern in the wage gap is clearly observed, as the
differential first decreases, then increases  with more experience. Furthermore, unionization
tends to be most advantageous  for those with less education. A clear trend of decreasing
wage differentials exists as educational  level increases.  In the case of men with more than
seven years of schooling  and more than ten years work experience,  unionization  may actually
be disadvantageous, indicating  that men in this category earn more, on average, in the
nonunion sector.
18Table 4:  Average Wage Differentials ()
by Gender, Experience  and Education
Education  (years)
Gender  Experience  (years)  0 to 3  3+ to 7  7+ to 12  12+
Male  0 to 10  0.21  0.18  0.05  -0.04
10+ to 20  0.12  0.13  -0.03  -0.08
Above  20  0.20  0.15  -0.01  -0.08
Female  0 to 10  ..  0.27  0.15  0.11
10+ to 20  0.26  0.20  0.11  0.09
Above  20  0.33  0.26  0.14  0.09
Source: Estimated  from  above  results  in Table  3.
Notes:  ..  indicates  small  cell  count.
The examination  of the wage differential  by the probability  of being an indigenous
person is listed in Table 5.  Those living in municipios  with more than a ten percent
indigenous  population experience  greater wage advantages  in the union sector than do those
with similar education and experience  in less indigenous  municipios.  For example, for those
with 10 to 20 years experience, and 7 to 12 years of schooling, the union-nonunion  wage
differential is nearly 31 times higher for those in more indigenous  areas than in less
indigenous  areas.
19Table 5:  Average Wage Differential ()
by Indigenous  Municipio Category,  Experience  and Education
Education  (vears)
Ethnicity  Experience  (vears)  0 to 3  3+ to 7  7+ to 12  12+
Non-indig.  0 to 10  0.20  0.18  0.07  0.0
10+ to 20  0.14  0.13  0.01  -0.05
Above  20  0.21  0.17  0.03  -0.05
Indigenous  0 to 10  ..  0.52  0.35
10+ to 20  0.37  0.41  0.31
Above  20  0.43  0.40  0.31
Source:  Estimated  from results  in Table  3.
Notes:  .. indicates  small  cell count. a Non-indigenous  indicates  municipios  of 10 percent  and  under
indigenous  population.  Indigenous  indicates  municipios  of over 10  percent  indigenous.
Wage  Dispersion and Income Inequality
This section compares  wage dispersion  and income inequality  between union and
nonunion workers for the entire sample and by gender and ethnic subsample.  The results
confirm much of the previous  research on this issue in that wages in the union sector tend to
be less dispersed and that income equality tends to be higher.  Furthermore, indigenous
people and women receive higher earnings in the union sector for a given set of
characteristics.
20The dispersion of log hourly wage in the union and nonunion sector in illustrated in
Figure 2.  The union dispersion  curve lies to the right of the nonunion curve, reflecting the
higher log hourly mean wage of 8.07 versus the nonunion log hourly wage mean of .'.76, a
statistically significant  difference.  Furthermore, the union wage distribution  is more peaked,
revealing less dispersion than the distribution  of nonunion wages.  The difference  between
the standard deviation of the log hourly wage in the union sector (0.656) versus the nonunion
standard deviation (0.78Z) is also statistically  significant.
Figure 2:  Distribution of Log Hourly Wages for Union and Nonunion Sectors
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Though organized labor in Mexico may not command very large wage differentials, it
has been effective in altering the wage structure, as evidenced  by the earnings equations.
With the reduced wage dispersion  the concomitant  effect of increases  in wage equality among
workers is observed.  The Lorenz curve diagram (Figure 3) illustrates  substantial  differences
21in the Gini coefficients  for both sectors.  In the nonunion sector, the estimated  Gini
coefficient is 42.1, a lower value than typically  observed in Latin America, largely due to the
fully employed nature of the subsample (Psacharopoulos  et al.  1993).  In the union sector the
Gini coefficient is greatly reduced to 33.5.
Figure 3:  Lorenz Curves for Union and Nonunion Subsamples
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Wage  Discrimination
A number of studies of the union-nonunion  wage differential  have examined  the
potential mitigation of wage discrimination  by organized labor.  Though several studies have
found union influence  on ethnic wage discrimination,  such studies have rarely found a sizable
union impact on gender wage discrimination. A recent study in the United Kingdom and
Lewis' (1986) review of wage differential literature in the United States both found the union
22mark-up nearly the same for both men and women (Main and Reilly 1992; Lewis 1986).
However, regarding ethnic wage discrimination,  Lewis (1986) found strong evidence of a
0.05 to 0.10 wage gap difference between the total population and non-whites, indicating a
larger union mark-up for non-whites. The benefits of umionization  among indigenous  people
is observed in a recent study in Canada, where unionization  was found to give indigenous
workers a slight earnings advantage  over non-Indians  (Patrinos and Sakellariou 1992).
The examination of potential  union mitigation  of discrimination  in this study finds
that, unlike other studies based on developed  nations, organized labor in Mexico plays a very
strong role in reducing  wage discrimination  against employed women and indigenous  people.
The diminution of gender and ethnic discrimination  is evidenced  by the previously discussed
differences in gender and ethnic variable parameters  between the two full sample earnings
equations in Table 3.  Regarding gender, the difference  in parameters between the union and
nonunion sector reveals a negative marginal effect on the overall wage gap, indicating a
greater union mark-up for women than for men.  Analysis  conducted  on only the nonunion
sector finds that 59.2 percent of the log hourly wage differential between men and working
women is unexplained  (controlling  for endowment  differences), whereas in the union sector,
the log hourly earnings between genders is not statistically  different. 3 This analysis serves as
strong evidence of the reduction and possibly the elimination of gender wage discrimination
by organized labor in Mexico. 4
3 Results available from authors upon request.
4 Note that this analysis  only compares the union wage differential  among working women. The reduction  in gender
wage discrimination  by unions  for all women, employed  and unemployed,  once accounting  for selectivity,  may differ.
23Ethnicity plays a significant  role in wage determination  in the nonunion sector.  The
estimated municipio indigenous  percent variable coefficient  of -0.8 indicates that for each
percentage point increase in the probability of a sampled individual  being indigenous, the
expected wage drops by 0.8 percent.  Thus, for someone living in a seventy percent
indigenous municipio  his/her expected wage drops by a substantial  56 percent compared to
someone living in a municipio  with no indigenous  people.  In contrast, in the union sector the
probability of being indigenous  is statistically  nonsignificant  with regard to wage
determination.  In addition, the difference in estimated  parameters for municipio indigenous
percent reveals a greater union mark-up for those living in indigenous  areas.  Analysis
conducted on only the nonunion sector finds 52.9 percent of the wage differential  between
those in less indigenous  areas (less than 5 percent indigenous  municipios)  and those in more
indigenous areas (above  20 percent indigenous  municipios)  can not be accounted for when
controlling for endowment  differences.  Similar to differenaces  in earnings by gender, in the
union sector, the log hourly earnings between more and less indigenous areas is not
statistically different.  When compared to the aforementioned  discrimination  against
indigenous people in the nonunion  sector, the lack of statistical  difference in earnings
between indigenous and nonindigenous  areas in the union sector serves as a strong indication
that unions help to substantially  reduce and possibly eliminate  wage discrimination  against
indigenous people.
24Northern Border
Nowhere  do the relations between the United States and Mexico play a more
significant role than they do in the border region between the two countries.  The cross-
border economic integration  of this region proved a critical element in the debate over free
trade.  In the review of NAFTA, one of the most politically  sensitive issues facing the
United States and Mexico has been the labor issue. Much of the debate has been fueled by
supposedly  low Mexican wage rates, often a tenth of comparable  wage rates in the United
States, and the popular assertion that Mexican labor is reluctant  to organize (Weintraub et al.
1991).  Because of the increasing  economic and political importance  of the northern border,
this section takes a closer look at this dynamic region.
Though overall wage rates in Mexico are considerably  lower on average than wage
rates m the United States, distinct regional variations in the wage rate in Mexico vary the
degree of wage rate difference between the two nations.  Analysis in regional  wage variations
in Mexico reveal that the northern border enjoys substantially  greater wage rates than the rest
of the country.  Table 6 examines average hourly wages  by region and union membership.
25Table 6:  Union & Nonunion  Hourly Wages (1989 pesos)
by Region
Region
North  Other  Total
Union  4,352  3,996 *  4,065 *
Nonunion  4,068 t  3,036  3,283
Total  4,137 t  3,321  3,506
Source:  INEGI  (1989)
Notes:  t indicates  statistical  different  at the 99% level  from 'other' region. * indicates  statistical
different  at the 99% level  from  nonunion  sector.
Hourly wages examined only by region show a considerable  hourly wage advantage in
the northern states, as previously noted (Table 3).  Hourly wages examined  only by union
status, when not accouting  for differences in worker quality, reveal a considerable  wage
advantage for union members.  However, when hourly wages are examined by both union
status and region, there is a revealing disparity. The mean hourly wage level in the northern
region between the union and nonunion sector is only 6.98 percent, which, when controlled
for endowment  differences  between the two sectors, amounts to the aforementioned  -2.1
percent union wage gap.  In the rest of the country, the mean wage rate difference  between
the two sectors is 31.6 percent or a much greater wage gap of 14.1 percent, when accounting
for worker differences.  This evidence seems to further substantiate  the weaker position of
unions in the northern region vis-i-vis the rest of the country.  This assertion is further
supported by the ob. erved -2.3 percent probability  of union membership  in northern states
found in the above union status logit analysis.  This evidence suggests  that Mexican labor in
the northern states is less likely to organize and when organized is weaker in comparison  to
organized labor in the rest of the country.
26To further examine the northern region, union and nonunion sector wage equations
are estimated for only those observations  in the northern states.  Table 7 lists the two wage
equations and the marginal contribution  of various characteristics  upon the overall wage gap.
Examining  the differences  between the equations, it is interesting  to note that in the union
sector, with the exception of tertiary education, schooling  makes no significant  difference on
hourly wage levels, indicative  of the extent to which unions standardize  rates of pay,
reducing wage dispersion  by permitting less individual  variation in wages for workers.  In
the nonunion sector, the usual earnings-education  profile is observed; that is, wages increase
monotonically  with education.  Gender is nonsignificant  in the union sector, and municipio
indigenous  percentage is nonsignificant  in both sectors, most probably due to the small
indigenous presence in the northern region.




Variable  Union  Nonunion  :@"-r)
Education  levela
Primary  0.224  0.214 t  0.004
(0.53)  (2.19)
Secondary  Incomplete  0.465  0.584 t  -0.039
(1.09)  (5.54)
Secondary  Complete  0.703  0.901 *  -0.027
(1.64)  (7.88)
Tertiary  1.080 t  1.289 t  0.032
(2.52)  (11.34)
Experience  0.053 t  0.063 t  -0.170
(6.62)  (12.46)
Experience  squared  -0.0008  -0.001 t  0.095
(5.08)  (10.58)
Male  0.088  0.151  -0.042
(1.57)  (3.86)
Municipio  Indigenous  Percent  0.017  -0.006  0.024
(1.23)  (0.96)
Industrial  Sectorab
Industrial  Manufacturing  -0.0006  -0.196  0.054
(0.005)  (1.11)
Utilities  0.167  -0.527  0.007
(0.873)  (1.80)
Construction  0.191  -0.343  0.051
(1.04)  (1.89)
Commerce  -0.072  -0.217  0.024
(0.48)  (1.22)
Transportadon  0.484  -0.152  0.023
(3.17)  (0.75)
Fmancial  Services  0.245  0.117  0.003
(1.33)  (0.56)
Services  0.312 t  -0.293  0.225
(2.58)  (1.67)
Constant  6.742  6.964  -0.222
Adjusted  R 2 0.292  0.214
N  541  1,652
Adjusted  Wage  Gap  -0.021
Source: INEGI  (1989)
Notes:  t significant  at the 95% level. * signifcant  at the 99% level. 'Residual is no education. "Residual sector  is
extraction. Numbers  is parenthesis  are t values.  0 is the estimated  coefficient. u and n subscripts  represent
union  and nonunion  subsamnples,  respectively.  I  is the fill sample  weighted  variable  mean.
28The variables controlling for industrial  sectors reveal some interesting  differences
between the union and nonunion sectors and the northern region and the rest of the country.
In the nonunion sector there is no statistically  significant  difference in wage rates between
industrial sectors, whereas in the union sector the transportation  and service industry wage
rates are significantly  different from the omitted extraction sector.  The greater inter-industry
wage dispersion  of the union sector compared to the nonunion  sector observed in the
northern region differs from the greater nonunion inter-industry  wage dispersion  commonly
observed in empirical analysis, including the earlier full sample analysis in this study (see
Table 3).
Conclusions
The estimated  union-nonunion  wage gap, based on a subsample  of 9,954 Mexican
workers from a 1989 household  survey, is about 10.4 percent.  By international  standards,
specifically OECD countries, this is a low value and may suggest the relative weakness  of
organized labor in Mexico at the time of the survey.  An exhaustive  survey of the literature
in the United States estimated an overall union-nonunion  wage gap of around 14 percent over
the period from 1967 to 1979.  In none of the 12 years surveyed did the yearly average fall
below 11 percent (Lewis 1986). A historical  understanding  of organized labor in Mexico
supports the assertion that organized labor experienced  difficult times in promoting the
interests of its membership  throughout  most of the 1980s. However, the estimated 10.4
percent earnings advantage  does indicate the existence  of some bargaining strength, possibly
29indicative of a recovery of organized labor's collective bargaining  capacity,  due in part to the
improving economic  situation of the country in the latter part of the decade.
The union wage gap varies considerably  by personal, regional and sectoral
characteristics. Personal characteristics,  such as years of labor market experience, gender
and ethnicity  play an important  role in determining the union-nonunion  wage gap.  Empirical
analysis finds that workers with little or no work experience  and workers with considerable
work experience, women and indigenous  people benefit to a greater extent in terms of hourly
wages when employed in the union sector than when employed in the nonunion sector.
Regional characteristics, most notably residence in northern states, are also important factors
in wage gap determination. The northern region's estimated wage gap of -2.1 percent
indicates a considerable diminution  of union collective  wage bargaining  strength in this
highly dynamic region, whereas  the union wage gap in the rest of the country is estimated at
a considerably  higher 14.1 percent. Among industrial sectors, the variation in the wage gap
is most pronounced in the services  sector where a strong wage incentive  exists in favor of
union membership.
Organized labor in Mexico, as elsewhere, is found to have a strong influence in
reducing wage dispersion.  The concomitant  of reduced wage  dispersion  - greater income
equality, is also observed in the union sector where the estimated Gini coefficient is nearly 9
points below the nonunion sector's Gini coefficient, 33.5 versus 42.1.
30Organized labor has a very strong influence  in reducing gender wage discrimination
and wage discrimination  against the indigenous  population. This study finds significant
indications  of greater wage discrimination  against women in the nonunion sector, whereas in
:he union sector, average wage rates have no statistically significant  difference between
genders.  The same is found true for native people.  Where wage discrimination  against
native people is high in the nonunion sector, it is almost absent in the union sector, as
evidenced  by the lack of a significant  statistical  difference in hourly wages between
indigenous and nonindigenous  people.
This paper has attempted to measure the union-nonunion  wage gap which should be
differentiated from the more elusive (or more difficult to estimate)  union wage gain.  Where
the union wage gap is essentially  the difference  in wages a worker would receive in the union
sector versus the nonunion sector, the union wage gain is the difference in wages that would
be observed in an economy in the presence  of unions versus wages in the absence of unions.
Therefore, though organized labor may at different times and in different regions not induce
substantial  wage gaps, it may have a substantial  effect in ircreasing overall wage rates in
general (both in the union and nonunion sector).  This point is noted as a caveat in that the
estimated wage gaps presented here should  not be taken as the full measure of organized
labor's effect on the Mexican wage structure, since the mere presence of unions can have a
significant  effect on wage rates and employment  standards elsewhere in the economy.
31It should also be noted that though unions do increase  income equality and reduce
wage discrimination,  this parity may be at the cost of factor efficiency and subject to specific
definition of equity.  If one deems a decrease in wage inequality  to a minimum as equitable,
then it can be strongly argued that unions enhance equity among fms  and perhaps the
economy as a whole.  However, if one perceives equity as compensation  based on merit and
effort, than the union standardization  of wages and strict seniority rules regarding wages and
benefits may seem inequitable  (Hirsch and Addison 1986).  The stage of a country's political
and economic  development is likely to influence  preferences  and policy choices in this
respect.
The debate over the effect of unions on the overall economic  efficiency of a nation is
ongoing.  Whether organized labor is conducive  to national growth and the success of
adjustment programs forwarded  by iurnational  lenders, among others, has recently been
addressed in an article by Freeman (1993), wherein he states, "Many economists  see unions
in developing countries as Peronist-style  organizations  that reduce efficiency at the enterprise
level and produce populist inflationary  macro-strategies. Some unions may fit this vision in
some countries in some time periods; but the evidence of the late 1980's rejects it as a broad
generalization" (Freeman, 1993: 404-405).  He goes on further to add, "At the macro level,
studies on the relation between unionism  and adjustment  in a variety of developing  countries
(Horton et al.,  1991) have found that 'weakening of the unions...does not seem to be
sufficient to ensure recovery', making it doubtful that 'launching into a wholescale  advocacy
of dismantling such institutions' is justifiable (see also Nelson, 1991)." (Freeman 1993: 405).
32Though studies have shown that while unions have modest wage effects and reduce the
growth of employment, consistent  with standard analysis, they are also associated  with lower
turnover, greater worker training, increased  benefits and higher productivity  (Standing 1992).
Surveying studies examining the net effect of unions on productivity, Sapsford and Tzannatos
(1993) found that, though by no means unanimous, the weight of available evidence suggests
that union workers are more productive  than their nonunion counterparts in manufacturing.
Moreover, the productivity differential  between union and nonunion labor may be sufficiently
large to offset the estimated  union-nonunion  wage differential (Ehrenberg  and Smith 1991).
Due to the fundamental  importance  of organized labor in national economies, potential
democracies  and the role of the civil society, a greater effort should be placed in the
accumulation  of relevant data in the future in order to fill the analytical  gaps that exists
concerning  unions in the developing world.  The results of this paper reveal that though
organized labor does effect the national wage structure in much the same way it does in the
developed  world, differences do exist.  In the case of Mexico, these differences serve as
valuable insights into the functioning  of the labor markets in the developing  world.
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